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Systemic Uncertainty: An Examination of Its Causes and Repercussions
Abstract
This paper examines the nature of systemic uncertainty and the character of public policy which causes it
by analyzing two time periods as case studies of how systemic uncertainty is generated by public policy
choices. I analyze financial data and polling data for evidence of systemic uncertainty to identify the form
of public policy and political leadership which results in the occurrence of uncertainty. My findings
suggest that systemic uncertainty is generated by a lack of commitment to the protection of private
property and/or a willingness to arbitrarily implement changes to the tax and regulatory structure in the
future.
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Kreider: Systemic Uncertainty

As world leaders seek out solutions for the mounting economic problems
which seem to insurmountably beset their fragile economies, it seems only natural
to inquire as to the causes of this prolonged economic malaise. One of the most
common explanations identifies low government expenditures as the culprit, but
after three successive years in which the United States federal government budget
has accounted for 40% or more of GDP, at the cost of rapidly escalating levels of
federal debt, the likelihood of this hypothesis has been cast into doubt. Another
school of thought, pioneered by Robert Higgs to explain the duration of the Great
Depression, places the onus of responsibility upon the arbitrary actions of policy
makers that instilled a “pervasive uncertainty among investors about the security
of their property rights in their capital and its prospective returns.”1 This paper
will proceed along similar lines to analyze a broader spectrum of U.S. economic
history, assessing why systemic uncertainty is evident in certain economic periods
and which environmental conditions tend to create it.
Theoretical Foundations of Systemic Uncertainty
The analysis of systemic uncertainty arising from environmental factors
within the political structure has become a popular topic since North and Thomas2
posited their transaction-cost theory of economic history to explain the rise of the
western world. According to those authors, economic growth is made possible
through the “development of an efficient economic organization … [which]
entails the establishment of institutional arrangements and property rights that
create an incentive to channel individual economic effort into activities that bring
the private rate of return close to the social rate of return.”3 Since then, a large
body of theoretical and empirical work has been dedicated to explaining and
quantifying the relationship between certain environmental conditions created by
government and the level of economic growth, with the basic propositions
advanced by North and Thomas receiving a great deal of support.4
In a way, North and Thomas’s work anticipated Higgs’ regime uncertainty
principle, identifying the primary theoretical links between the political structure
and economic growth as uncertainty and rent-seeking behavior. This paper will
1

Robert Higgs, “Regime Uncertainty: Why the Great Depression Lasted So Long and Why
Prosperity Resumed after the War,” The Independent Review 1, no. 4 (1997): 561-590, 563.
2
Douglass North and Robert Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
3
Ibid, 1.
4
See Silvio Borner, Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder, Political Credibility and Economic
Development (New York: St. Martins Press, 1995); Mancur Olson, 1996, “Big Bills Left on the
Sidewalk: Why some nations are rich and others poor,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10
(1995): 3-24; World Bank, The State in a Changing World (New York; Oxford University Press,
1997).
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focus on the first of those theoretical links, but the second is deserving of
tangential acknowledgement, as it is a by-product of the activities of government
that Higgs identifies as causing uncertainty.5 When government’s commitment to
private property declines, it is natural for individuals to advance and/or protect
their interests by rent-seeking behavior, lobbying government officials and
engaging the public policy process, activities which Henisz describes as, “at best,
zero sum.”6 Hence rent-seeking behavior may be viewed as a response to, or
symptom of, systemic uncertainty, as individuals attempt to mitigate the level of
uncertainty by influencing policy makers, and is sometimes used as a part of
quantitative models of uncertainty.
Thus the primary causal nexus is the uncertainty principle which Higgs so
aptly captured. Fundamentally, the problems of uncertainty are related to
government expropriation of private property, or the threat of such expropriation,
or of arbitrary tax or regulatory regime changes, all of which discourage market
participants from engaging in normal profit-seeking behavior. This form of
uncertainty is not simply caused by the government’s lack of commitment to
private property rights, but by the inability of market participants to ascertain
what type of regime will exist in the future. As Stasavage writes, “If a firm fears
that a government will have an incentive to make ex post changes in taxes or
regulations, it may prefer to delay or cancel a proposed project.”7
When the character of a nation’s governance undermines the trust of
investors, the trust which makes them sure of their possessions, there are a
number of adverse impacts. First of all, it stifles private investment, for when
firms and individuals react to uncertainty, it fundamentally alters their willingness
to risk assets in the present. Thus any theory of private investment that neglects
to include political environmental factors will not be able to fully explain the
behavior of investors.8 Similarly, economic growth can’t simply be understood as
the inevitable progress of market economies, but rather as the direct result of the
development of institutional structures that support social and commercial profitmaximizing relationships by protecting private property and establishing a system

5

Robert Higgs 1997, 567.
Witold Henisz, “The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth,” Economics and Politics
12, no. 1 (2000): 1-31, 4.
7
David Stasavage, “Private Investment and Political Uncertainty,” London School of Economics
Discussion Paper No. DEDPS 25 (2000): 1-37, 1.
8
Ibid, 1; Joseph Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis
of the Capitalist Process (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939); and Robert Pindyck, “Irreversibility,
Uncertainty, and Investment,” Journal of Economic Literature 29 (1991): 1110-48, 1141.
6
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to enforce contracts and resolve disputes.9 Without such a commitment to
property rights and the rule of law, private investment will be repressed, to the
detriment of the national economy as a whole.10 Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajsek
(2009) find that increases in uncertainty lead to an increase in the cost of capital,
through an increase in bond premia, which negatively impacts private
investment.11 Similarly, Arellano, et al, show that increases in uncertainty lead to
downsizing of investment projects to avoid default.12
The wariness of investors to risk their capital under conditions of political
uncertainty not only negatively impacts the magnitude of private investment, but
also has a severe distortionary impact on the rates investors demand, the
instruments they use, and the time-frames for which they are willing to part with
their funds. When faced with systemic uncertainty, investors demand higher
rates, especially for long-term capital outlays, and use financial instruments to
mitigate their downside risk. This can be clearly seen in the yield curve for
corporate bonds, which develop wide gaps between the nominal returns to
different maturities.13 Thus resources are allocated away from the long-term
investment opportunities that are necessary for the growth of the capital stock.
This inter-temporal distortion is only compounded in economies that rely on
entrepreneurial individuals to drive economic growth.14
Resources may also be diverted towards derivative instruments that are
designed to mitigate uncertainty. When investors are faced with uncertainty, they
can control their downside risk by exercising a “wait-and-see” strategy,15 using
options as a hedge. The prices of options are subject to the supply of, and demand
for, these instruments, thus theoretically, a sudden increase in the uncertainty felt
by investors could be observed in an increased demand for, and a subsequent
9

Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1990); Henisz, “Institutional Environment,” (2000), 2; Peter Klein,
“New Institutional Economics,” in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, eds. B. Bouckeart and G.
De Geest (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000): 456-89, 458; and Peter Klein and Hung Luu,
“Politics and Productivity,” Economic Inquiry 41, no. 3 (2003): 433-47, 433.
10
Pindyck, “Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment,” (1991): 1141.
11
Simon Gilchrist, Jae Sim and Egon Zakrajsek, “Uncertainty, Financial Frictions, and Investment
Dynamics,” mimeo Boston University Department of Economics (2010): 1-43.
12
Cristina Arellano, Yan Bai and Patrick Kehoe, “Financial Markets and Fluctuations in
Uncertainty,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department Staff Report (2010).
13
Higgs, “Regime Uncertainty,” (1997): 583.
14
Lee Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass North, introduction to Empirical Studies in
Institutional Change, eds. Lee Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass North (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4.
15
Nicholas Bloom, “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks,” Econometrica 77, no. 3 (2009): 623–
685.
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increase in the price of, derivative instruments. Dreschler writes, “the prices of
index options are sensitive to investors' level of uncertainty,” indeed, “options
provide a hedge to variation in the level of uncertainty itself.”16 When the
increased demand for derivative instruments is artificially inflated by government
intervention, at least a portion of the resources directed to that purpose are no
longer profit-maximizing and can be observed in the general price trend of these
instruments.
Furthermore, the lack of political constraint on government officials
complicates the entrepreneurial forecasting that is essential for the successful
creation of new production structures and consumer goods. While the majority of
the literature on this topic focuses on the impacts systemic uncertainty has on
investors, the analysis can be easily extended to entrepreneurs. The causal-realist
school has developed a rich understanding of the entrepreneur through the works
of Mises17, Rothbard18, et al. In summarizing this body of literature on the
entrepreneurial role, Peter Klein19 writes, “The entrepreneurial function has been
characterized in various ways: judgment (Cantillon, 1755; Knight, 1921; Casson,
1982; Langlois and Cosgel, 1993; Foss and Klein, 2005), innovation (Schumpeter,
1911), adaptation (Schultz, 1975, 1982), alertness (Kirzner, 1973), and
coordination (Witt 1998).”20 A discussion of these various definitions is beyond
16

Itamar Dreschler, “Uncertainty, Time-Varying Fear, and Asset Prices,” Wharton School of
Business (2009): 1-68, 1.
17
Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises
Institute, 1998).
18
Murray Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles (Princeton, NJ:
Van Nostrand, 1962).
19
Peter Klein, “Opportunity Discovery, Entrepreneurial Action, and Economic Organization,”
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, forthcoming (2008): 1-33, 4.
20
Richard Cantillon, 1755. Essai sur la nature de commerce en general, Henry Higgs, ed.
(London:
Macmillan, 1931); Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (New York: August M. Kelly
Publishing, 1964); Mark Casson, The Entrepreneur: An economic Theory (Oxford: Martin
Robertson, 1982); Richard Langlois and Metin Cosgel, “Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, and
the Firm: A New Interpretation,” Economic Inquiry 31 (1993): 456–65; Nicolai Foss and Peter
Klein, “Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of the Firm: Any Gains from Trade?” in
Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research: Disciplinary Perspectives, Rashjree Agarwal, Sharon
A. Alvarez, and Olaf Sorenson, eds.,. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005); Joseph Schumpeter, The
Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the
Business Cycle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1911); T.W. Schultz, “The Value of
the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria,” Journal of Economic Literature 13 (1975): 827–46; T.W.
Schultz, “Investment in Entrepreneurial Ability,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 82 (1982):
437–48; Israel Kirzner, Perception, Opportunity and Profit: Studies in the Theory of
Entrepreneurship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Ulrich Witt, “Imagination and
Leadership: the Neglected Dimension of an Evolutionary Theory of the Firm,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 35 (1998): 161–77.
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the scope of this paper,21 but suffice it to say that the theme that runs throughout
is the intimate connection between entrepreneurs and uncertainty.
Entrepreneurial success is determined by the ability of the entrepreneur to
predict future market conditions and find a combination of productive factors that
can best satisfy those conditions. As Mises writes, “The ultimate source from
which entrepreneurial profit and loss are derived is the uncertainty of the future
constellation of demand and supply,”22 echoing Cantillon, who wrote that,
“Entrepreneurs work for uncertain wages.”23 Knight (1964) used this conception
of model uncertainty to link entrepreneurial judgment to profit and loss (1964,
271).24 Thus arbitrary government policies increase the model uncertainty facing
entrepreneurs and hamper their ability to engage in economic calculation and
ascertain profitable opportunities.
Thus the adverse impacts of government induced uncertainty include both
the dead weight loss of resources allocated to non-profit-maximizing activities
and the opportunity cost of new products and inventions stifled by the high degree
of uncertainty facing entrepreneurs. Using this theoretical foundation, economists
have used a wide array of formal models to simulate the relationship between
politically generated systemic uncertainty and economic behavior. The most
common practice is to create an index or proxy for political constraints and/or
economic freedom that captures the commitment of the political structure to
property rights and the degree of institutional restraints.25 Such models have
found political constraints to have a highly significant effect on GDP,26 lagged
GDP growth,27 productivity,28 and private investment.29 However, as noted by
Henisz (2000), many of these indexes lack a theoretical connection to the
21

See Klein, “Discovery, Action, and Organization,” (2008).
Mises, Human Action (1998), 291.
23
Richard Cantillon, Essai sur (1755), 54.
24
Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (New York: August M. Kelly, Bookseller, 1964),
271.
25
Henisz, “Institutional Environment,” (2000), 4-5.
26
See Rudiger Dornbusch, “Policies to Move from Stabilization to Growth,” Proceedings of the
1990
World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics (1991): 19-48; Kevin Murphy,
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics (1991): 503-530; Dani Rodrik, “The Positive Economics of
Policy Reform,” American Economic Review 83 (1993): 356-361.
27
See Robert Barro, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 106 (1991): 407-43; Henisz, “Institutional Environment,” (2000).
28
See Klein and Luu, “Politics and Productivity,” (2003).
29
See Stasavage, “Private Investment and Political Uncertainty,” (2000); Brandon Julio and
Youngsuk Yook, “Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles,” Journal of Finance,
forthcoming (2010).
22
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commitment to private property that rests at the heart of the systemic uncertainty
problem (2000, 5).
Economic Recessions and Evidence of Systemic Uncertainty
Into the muddied waters of this empirical literature, Higgs (1997) used
polling data and evidence from financial markets to analyze what he coined,
“regime uncertainty.” This paper will expand on that analysis, applying similar
logic and augmented evidence to several periods of economic malaise since the
Great Depression, looking for the sources of observed systemic recession. The
first task is thus to determine the periods for analysis. The National Bureau of
Economic Research’s (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee (2010) provides
us with an excellent starting place. According to the NBER, there have been ten
periods of economic recession since the Great Depression, where they define a
recession as a substantial drop in economic activity for a prolonged duration and
across a widespread area, visible in the fluctuations of real GDP, real income,
employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. The NBER table
can be seen below. For the purpose of comparison, I’ve chosen two time periods
for analysis: March 2001 - Nov. 2001 and Dec. 2007 - June 2009. The rationale
behind this choice is that the character of government leadership over those
periods varied from President Bush to President Obama, and thus gives us the best
glimpse at how the character of government and the commitment to property
rights impacts systemic uncertainty.
Peak

Trough

Quarterly dates
are in parentheses

July
1953(II)
August
1957(III)
April
1960(II)
December 1969(IV)
November 1973(IV)
January
1980(I)
July
1981(III)
July
1990(III)
March
2001(I)
December 2007 (IV)

May
1954
(II)
April
1958
(II)
February 1961 (I)
November 1970 (IV)
March
1975
(I)
July
1980
(III)
November 1982 (IV)
March
1991(I)
November 2001 (IV)
June 2009 (II)

Contraction

Expansion

Cycle

Peak
to
Trough

Previous
trough
to
this peak

Trough
from
Previous
Trough

Peak
from
Previous
Peak

10
8
10
11
16
6
16
8
8
18

45
39
24
106
36
58
12
92
120
73

55
47
34
117
52
64
28
100
128
91

56
49
32
116
47
74
18
108
128
81

Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. “U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and
Contractions,” NBER.org, < http://www.nber.org/cycles.html> Accessed Dec. 2, 2011.
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Departing from the proper chronological order, we begin with an analysis
of the polling data surrounding the most recent financial collapse, aided by the
relative recentness of the polling data available and the multitude of different
indexes provided by business research groups. Looking at the polling results, the
intense ideological debate which characterized the 2008 election provides the
most striking example of systemic uncertainty since Roosevelt’s New Deal. Early
evidence of this can be found in a September 2008 poll conducted by Chief
Executive Magazine,30 which found that an astounding 74% percent of CEOs
polled “feared” an Obama presidency. That poll found that then-candidate
Obama’s tax policies scored the lowest in overall approval, though his stances on
regulatory policy scored a close second. As president, Obama has not faired any
better. A 2010 Bloomberg survey of 873 of its subscribers, conducted by Selzer
& Co., found that 77% of the business and financial leaders surveyed believed
Obama to be too anti-business. One respondent, David Young, a managing
director for a broker dealer in New York, said, “Investors no longer feel they can
trust their instincts to take risks.”31 Participants in that poll cited Obama’s efforts
to trim bonuses and earnings, make health care his top priority over jobs, and
plans to tax rich ”fat cats,” as primary sources of their uneasiness.32
The lack of confidence in President Obama’s policies has coincided with a
period of economic turmoil, the combined effect of which can clearly be seen in
the polling numbers. The Business Roundtable and the Chief Executive Magazine
each conduct regular surveys of business executives, which, though lacking in
specificity, can be used to gauge the general sentiments of these industry leaders.
Graph 133 plots the poll numbers of these indexes from 2003 - 2011, with various
important dates marked. As Graph 1 indicates, business leaders were well ahead
of the general population in foreseeing the coming economic collapse, at least in
the Chief Executive Magazine CEO Index, and their confidence has not yet
returned to a pre-recession level.
The problem with using these CEO Confidence Indices is that they
incorporate the sentiments of business leaders on a wide array of issues; the
economy as a whole, market demand, etc. Thus, for our purposes, more in depth
information is necessary to identify with any degree of certainty what events led
30

Chief Executive, “Job Creators Prefer John McCain 4-to-1 Over Barack Obama,”
ChiefExecutive.net, October 8, 2008, accessed December 9, 2011, http://chiefexecutive.net/jobcreators-prefer-john-mccain-4-to-1-over-barack-obama.
31
Heidi Przybyla, “Obama Seen as Anti-Business by 77% of U.S. Investors,” Bloomberg.com,
Jan. 21, 2010, accessed Dec. 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8UiI1bCRdmY.
32
Ibid.
33
See Appendix 1: Graphs for Graph 1 - 10.
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to this prolonged lack of confidence. Higgs34 lists the multitude of legislative
enactments that characterized the New Deal to support his case, and while a
similar list for the current time period is far shorter, it’s most notable members,
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), are each
thousands of pages long with far-ranging economic impacts. Perhaps most
importantly, however, each bill delegates unprecedented rulemaking authority to
the federal bureaucracy, creating an estimated 159 new agencies, boards,
commissions, and other entities.35 As Gary Lawson writes about the healthcare
reform act, “As is true of most modern legislation of any consequence, the
PPACA is not so much a set of norms to regulate conduct as an authorization to
administrators to produce norms to regulate conduct.”36 According to the Federal
Register’s website, Dodd-Frank has been the subject of 590 rules and notices, an
unprecedented total only dwarfed by the PPACA, which has generated an
astounding 1,313 rules and notices, about a third of which are still in the proposal
and comment stage.37
As was discussed earlier, the inability on the part of entrepreneurs to
ascertain future market conditions because of arbitrary government intervention is
one of the primary causes of uncertainty. And the survey responses of business
leaders indicate that the PPACA and Dodd-Frank are creating this sort of
uncertain business environment. Shortly after the 2010 midterm elections, the
Midwest Business Group on Health conducted a survey of business leaders and
found that 60% of their sample believed that the intent of the PPACA was to
eliminate the current employer-based system of health care delivery and move to
a single-payer system. 64% of all respondents indicated that they expected the
PPACA to increase the cost of doing business, including 80% of employers from
companies with greater than 500 employees.38 Larry Boress, MGBH President
and CEO said, “There remains a great deal of uncertainty among employers about

34

Higgs, “Regime Uncetainty,” (1997).
Grace-Marie Turner, et al, Why ObamaCare is Wrong for America (New York: HarperCollins,
2011).
36
Gary Lawson, “Reviving Formal Rulemaking: Openness and Accountability for Obamacare,”
Heritage Backgrounder no. 2585, July 25, 2011
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2585.pdf.
37
Federal Register.gov, Accessed 12/5/2010 http://www.federalregister.gov.
38
Midwest Business Health Group, “Key Findings of Employer Reaction to Health Reform-Post
Election Survey,” Dec. 22, 2010,
https://www.mbgh.org/templates/UserFiles/Files/Key%20Findings%20of%20Dec%202010%20S
urvey%20of%20Employers%20Reacton%20to%20Health%20Reform(2).pdf.

35
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how health reform will ultimately impact their efforts to provide health benefits
for their employees.”39
Additionally, business leaders remain skeptical that the lofty goals of the
PPACA will be achieved. 86% of those surveyed by the MBGH responded that
it’s unlikely the PPACA will reduce the rate at which health care costs are
increasing, with 74% responding that the bill will actually increase costs faster
than if it hadn’t been passed.40 A McKinsey & Company poll of 1,329 private
sector employers found that 36.6% of respondents currently offering employersponsored health plans would probably or definitely drop those plans after 2014
due to cost escalation. And the more a respondent understood about the PPACA,
the more likely they were to drop their current plans, with 68.3% of respondents
evidencing “high” awareness of the bill’s content responding that they’d either
probably or definitely end employer-sponsored insurance.41 A similar poll of
small business owners conducted by Discover Small Business Watch found that
47% of small business owners were considering ending their employee health
coverage due to rising costs, and that 55% of small business owners favor
repealing the PPACA altogether.42
When it comes to Dodd-Frank, there is dissension among industry
professionals about how the law’s different provisions will impact their financial
strategies. The opinions of banking professionals and fund managers carry
additional weight since their sentiments are directly tied to the amount of capital
they are willing to invest on behalf of their clients, which forms a large share of
the nation’s private investment. A poll conducted by Ernst & Young of brokerage
firm compliance officers found that high percentages of respondents believed that
the changes made by Dodd-Frank and the subsequent Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) regulations authorized by that legislation, will
have a “high impact” on their compliance costs.43 71.5% of the participants in
that survey responded that the FINRA suitability requirements would have a high
39

Larry Boress, qtd. in Jenny Ivy, “Reform takes aim at benefits, employers say,”
benefitspro.com, Jan. 3, 2011, http://www.benefitspro.com/2011/01/03/reform-takes-aim-atbenefits-employers-say.
40
MBHG, “Key Findings,” 3.
41
McKinsey & Co., “Employer Survey on US Health car e Reform: Details regarding the survey
methodology,” mckinsey.com, June 2011,
www.mckinsey.com/Features/US_employer_healthcare_survey.
42
Discover Small Business Watch, “Discover Survey Finds Majority of Small Business Owners
Favor Repeal of Health-Care Reform Law,” InsuranceTechnology, Jan. 18, 2011, http://insurancetechnology.tmcnet.com/news/2011/01/18/5251891.htm.
43
Ernst & Young, “Compliance perspectives on new regulations 2011,” www.ey.com, 2011
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Compliance_Perspectives_on_New_Regulation_201
1_FINAL/$FILE/Compliance_Perspectives_on_New_Regulation_2011_FINAL.pdf, 4.
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impact on their compliance costs. A similar study conducted by Grant Thornton
LLP, found that 91% of the bank CEOs, CFOs and audit committee members
surveyed identified the burden of regulatory reform on their bank as the primary
concern for their institution over the next 12 months.44 In that study, 48% of
respondents indicated that they believe Dodd-Frank will not be effective at all in
detecting systemic risks to the financial industry.45 A similar question posed to
the attendees at Hedge Fund Association’s Risk and Regulation Symposium
found that 93% of the fund managers surveyed at the event, a somewhat biased
sample due to the self-selected nature of the group, responded that Dodd-Frank
would not prevent another market crash.46
The common sentiment among financial and banking industry
professionals thus appears to be a combination of doubt over Dodd-Frank’s
effectiveness and dismay over what they perceive to be a dramatic increase in
their compliance costs. The additional oversight of derivative instruments and
the elimination of proprietary trading have created a great deal of uncertainty
regarding future profits. A survey of derivatives traders conducted by the TABB
Group found that almost 90% of those surveyed believe that the Dodd-Frank will
have a negative effect on their ability to make a profit, while about two thirds of
the sample thought the act would erect steep barriers to entry in the market.47
An interesting result of the polling on Dodd-Frank is that investors appear
more pessimistic about the actual content of the law, and subsequent regulation.
Compared to the PPACA, Dodd-Frank’s language has been more definitely laid
out and the negative reaction on the part of industry professionals seems to be
primarily opposition to that language and the way in which it will negatively
impact their business models.
Augmenting the polling evidence provided above, an examination of the
financial data during the time period from 2007 - 2011 shows that private
investment did/has not recovered to anywhere close to its pre-recession level. In
the second quarter of 2006, real gross private investment was at $2,263.1 billion
and one year later it stood at $2,193.0 billion. Then the financial crisis hit and
44

Nichole Jordan, “Bank Executive Survey: Bankers’ optimism rebounds amid concerns over
Dodd-Frank,” www.grantthornton.com, June 2011, accessed Dec. 8, 2011,
http://www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Financial%20services/FSandFI%20files/Bank%
20Survey/Grant%20Thornton%20LLP-Bank%20Director18th%20Annual%20Bank%20Executive%20Survey.pdf, 2.
45
Ibid.
46
Jing Chen, “Fund Managers Not Dodd-Frank Fans,” www.hedgefund.net, Sept. 27, 2011,
accessed Dec. 7, 2011, http://hedgefund.net/publicnews/default.aspx?story=12914.
47
Kevin McPartland, “Credit and Rate Swap Dealers 2011: Redefined and Reborn,” Tabb
Group.com, Oct. 12, 2011 http://www.tabbgroup.com/PublicationDetail.aspx?PublicationID=996.
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gross private investment dropped almost a trillion dollars to $1,397.2 billion in the
second quarter of 2009, the bottom of the investment trough, roughly three
quarters after the failure of Lehman Brothers. And over the last two quarters,
private investment has plateaued at around $1.8 billion per annum, as can be
clearly seen in Graph 2. Even if we remove residential investment from the data,
and consider non-residential real private investment, we can still see that private
investment, while on a steeper upward trajectory, is still well below the prerecession levels.
Furthermore, the labor market in the U.S. has clearly not fully recovered,
with the number of employed workers in all private industries still falling six
million below its pre-recession level.48 The employment aspects of both the Chief
Executive and Business Roundtable CEO Confidence indices remain well below
the broader index values, evidencing significant uncertainty within the labor
market. A measure of evidence contrary to this position was obtained by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Business Outlook Survey49, depicted in
Graph 3, which surveys manufacturers in the Third Federal Reserve district. The
diffusion indices, calculated as the difference in the percentage of manufacturers
who have reported (present) or expect (future) employment increases and those
who have reported or expect decreases, show that manufacturers in that sample
have recovered to a greater extent than those surveyed by other studies. The
difference among uncertainties generated within different industries may be an
interesting area for further research, or perhaps this is capturing a geographical
trend, but it is in disagreement with other survey data on business executives and
has been used as the basis for several studies disputing systemic uncertainty.50
There is also substantive evidence of continuing systemic uncertainty to be
found in the market for corporate bonds. According to data obtained from the
Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System, the yield rates for 30-, 60-,
and 90-day maturities of AA-rated non-financial corporate paper have differed
from each by an average of .87%51 from 1997-2007, with two deviations to about
a 10% difference between 30- and 90-day maturities in the summer of 2000.
48

Robert Higgs, “U.S. Economic Recovery Remains Anemic, at Best,” The Beacon Blog, Nov. 6,
2011, http://blog.independent.org/2011/11/06/u-s-economic-recovery-remains-anemic-at-best.
49
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, “Business Outlook Survey,”www.phil.frb.org, accessed
Dec. 12, 2011, http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/regional-economy/business-outlooksurvey/.
50
Rudiger Bachmann and Christian Bayer, “Uncertainty Business Cycles - Really?” National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 16862 (2009); Rudiger Bachmann, Steffen
Elstner and Eric Sims, “Uncertainty and Economic Activity, Evidence from Business Survey Data,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 16143 (2010).
51
The percent difference between non-financial AA-rate corporate paper of 30- and 90- day
maturities averaged for every month during the years 1997 - 2007.
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During the financial crisis, the percent difference between the yields on 30- and
90-day commercial paper reached an astounding 74.2%. Simultaneously, the
difference between 30- and 60-day maturities also increased to 64.8%. Since that
time, the difference between the rates-of-return has failed to return to prerecession values, as can be clearly seen in Graph 4. While the stock market may
have recovered much of the value it lost during the financial crisis, the steep yield
curve exhibited by the difference between varied maturities of corporate bonds is
compelling evidence that investors are uncomfortable with parting from their
capital over long-periods without a much greater return on their investment.
The effect of uncertainty is even more pronounced in the market for AArated financial paper, see Graph 5, where the effects of the financial meltdown
and the ongoing debt crisis in Europe is wreaking havoc on the ability of market
participants to accurately forecast into the future. Thus in the financial sector, far
from dissipating after peaking at a 69.9% difference between 30- and 90-day
maturities in September 2009 and subsequently declining, the yield gap has been
steadily trending back upward, reaching 57.14% in November of 2011, the latest
month for which data is available.
Turning to the financial data on financial derivative instruments meant to
transfer or mitigate risk, two of the most obvious instruments to examine are
interest rate swaps, futures contracts, and options. Interest rate swaps can be used
to mitigate risk exposure to interest rate fluctuations, among other functions, and
thus under conditions of greater systemic uncertainty, the premium put upon longterm contracts increases relative to their shorter-duration counterparts. While
much of the data on options and futures is proprietary, the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors data contains the interest premium charged on interest rate swaps
over the past decade, and as before, there is a clear difference between varying
contract terms, see Graph 6. Prior to the financial collapse, interest rate swaps of
1- and 3-year were nearly on par, separated by only 1 - 6%. But through 2008,
the interest rate swap differential has not fallen below 50% until August, 2011.
With the evidence from the current economic situation before us, let us
turn our focus towards the smaller recession that the NBER data indicates during
2001, the first term of President Bush. The bursting of the so-called “dot com
bubble,” caused a dramatic stock sell-off of internet companies and a period of
GDP decline over the course of several months. As previously seen in Chart 1,
business confidence reached and maintained high numbers from 2003 until the
financial collapse discussed in the preceding pages. Yet President Bush’s first
year in office was characterized by a stock market collapse, the September 11th
attacks, and economic recession. According to the NBER numbers, the recession
of 2001 lasted only eight months, but the stock market slump continued over
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almost two-years, with the S&P Index dropping almost half of its value during
that period. Private investment continued to slump through much of 2002,
returning to its former upward trajectory at pre-bubble levels in 2003 - 2004.
Evidence from polling data surrounding that time supports the general
assertion that President Bush was generally viewed as a “pro-business” president.
During his reelection campaign, a Fortune Small Business poll found that 53% of
entrepreneurs and small-business owners preferred President Bush to challenger
John Kerry.52 The Duke University Fuqua School of Business and Financial
Executives International conducted quarterly polls from 1998 - present, and their
results indicate that though the economy was generally underperforming, large
percentages of CFOs and CEOs remained confident that an economic rebound
was imminent. Even during the height of the 2001 recession, quarter 3, the FEI
survey found that a full 48% of respondents indicated that they were planning on
adding to the payroll in the coming quarter, with an average reported percent
increase of 3.31%.53
The September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon
shattered what looked like a quick recovery. The stock market plunged to lower
levels than seen during the trough of the recession. Yet in the midst of that, the
FEI survey found that 88% of CFOs believed that the country’s economic future
was secure and would rebound by either the first (17%) or second (71%) of
2002.54 The fourth quarter report of the Fuqua FEI report continued this trend,
with CFO’s overwhelming responding that employment would come back from
its highpoint of 5.7% and 53% of respondents answering that their own firms
would be hiring in 2002.55 While the results of the survey indicate that only
modest growth was predicted, the main point is that they still generally viewed the
conditions of the economy positively. By the first quarter of 2002, 259 out of 260
surveyed CFOs responded that GDP growth for 2002 would be positive and that
corporate earnings would be up.56
It would be theoretically convenient to point to the robust business
confidence in this period by pointing to the Bush Tax Cuts passed in two parts in
2001 and 2003. However, several survey results would undermine this. In the
first quarter of 2002, only 1.7% of CFOs in the Fuqua FEI survey identified the
52

Richard Murphy, “Why Bush Gets a Thumbs-Up on Main Street,” Fortune Small Business, Oct.
1, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/2004/10/01/8187291/index.htm.
53
Duke/CFO Magazine, “Global Business Outlook Survey,” cfosurvey.org, accessed Dec. 12,
2011, http://www.cfosurvey.org/index.htm.
54
Ibid, 2001 Quarter 3 results sheet.
55
Ibid, 2001 Quarter 4 results sheet.
56
Ibid, 2002 Quarter 1 results sheet.

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012

13

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 9 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 5

new tax laws as having the greatest effect on their business for the coming year,
while consumer spending came in at 37.6%.57 However, this result can actually
be viewed as support for the argument that the level of uncertainty that occurred
as a result of the political actions taken by George W. Bush was minimal. Across
the next three years of survey data, no political factor ever ranked above 5% on
this particular question as businesses focused on the problems of labor supply,
technological advancement, and consumer spending patterns. The silence speaks
volumes.
The financial data generally confirms this analysis. Over the period from
2001 - 2003, private investment steadily rebounded, even accounting for the
secondary dip after the attacks on September 11th. Private investment reversed its
downward trajectory by the fourth quarter of 2001, and by early 2004 it surpassed
its pre-2000 level of $2.01 trillion. Comparing the private investment graphs for
the 2001 and 2008 recessions, shown in Graph 7, the greatest difference to be
seen is the duration of the change. The left-hand graph, though following the
same basic pattern of the right-hand graph, accomplishes a complete rebound in
under two years. The right-hand graph shows only half as much progress over
almost three years. This growth is even more impressive when one considers that
the primary economic causal forces were supplemented by the terrorist attacks on
9-11, which provided a short-run crisis in the stock market.
There is an interesting discrepancy to note among the financial data,
however. The yield differentials over this time period were consistent with the
data presented above, with very small differences across the terms to maturity for
non-financial, and financial, corporate paper, see Graph 8. In this regard, the
difference between the returns to various maturities fluctuates for the most part
between 0 and +/- 5%, with notable exceptions directly preceding national
elections for president, which Julio and Yook found to be highly predictive of
cyclical investment behavior.58 But the interest swap rates over President Bush’s
first year in office manifested a high degree of divergence based upon the length
of the contract. The analysis advanced previously would thus conclude that a
high degree of model uncertainty existed with regard to interest rate fluctuations.
This seemingly contradictory finding can be explained with an examination of
President Bush’s monetary policy during his first term. Under the leadership of
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, President
Bush expanded the money supply dramatically over the course of his first term.
Graph 9 tracks the expansion of the money supply, M1, during that time. Apart
from the dramatic surge that can be seen in the fall of 2001, President Bush
57
58

Ibid.
Julio and Yook, “Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles,” (2010).
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steadily increased the supply of money supply through aggressive monetary
policy, in the words of Greenspan himself, “During 2001, in the aftermath of the
bursting of the bubble and the acts of terrorism in September 2001, the federal
funds rate was lowered 4 ¾ percentage points. Subsequently, another 75 basis
points were pared, bringing the rate by June 2003 to its current 1 percent, the
lowest level in 45 years.”59
Given the inflationary policies being followed to mitigate the negative
effects of the burst, it should be no surprise that investors were faced with a
measure of interest rate uncertainty. It would be interesting to examine whether
such trends extended to other financial derivative instruments, but for the
moment, we will content ourselves with the inflationary explanation. The
difference between the rates earned on different term to maturity interest swaps
can be seen below in Graph 10, where we can see that the percent differences
almost reach the same level of magnitude as in the 2007-2010 case.
Conclusion
There are a number of policy lessons that can be learned from the
differences between the way Presidents Bush and Obama responded to economic
crises. Though both administrations pursued similar fiscal and monetary policy,
to some extent, the commitment to the business community and property rights
that existed under President Bush, or at least the popular perception of the same,
his roll-back of regulatory burdens, and his lowering of marginal tax rates across
the board created an environment in which investors and entrepreneurs felt
comfortable taking on additional risk. Evidence of this can be clearly seen in the
polling data, where the confidence of the business community in the overall
trajectory of the economy hardly faltered under Bush, despite poor economic
performance, and in the financial data, where we can see private investment and
bond yield differentials returning to pre-recession values with relative rapidity.
Thus the environmental factors necessary to create systemic uncertainty never
materialized in the period following the implosion of the “dot com bubble” in
2001.
Under President Obama’s administration, on the other hand, the federal
government has fostered an atmosphere that is not conducive to economic
recovery. Passage of the PPACA and Dodd-Frank has only exacerbated the
uncertainty which already accompanied the generally unfavorable impressions
with which business leaders viewed his leadership style. And upon careful
59

Alan Greenspan, “Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy,” The American Economic Review
94, no. 2 Papers and Proceedings of the 116th Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association (May, 2004): 33-40, 36.
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reflection, the rhetoric of “fairness,” which has crept into almost every aspect of
the president’s reelection bid, will only further damage his rapport with the
business community, providing them with further evidence that his administration
is strongly contemplating significant revisions to the tax code in the future.
Between July 22 and October 6, 2011, President Obama held over sixteen events
in which the theme of his address was tax hikes on topmost-bracket income
earners.60 Yet so far, he has been unable to put those policies in place, only
adding to the uncertainty. If Obama is re-elected, he may well have the
opportunity to move forward with many of his other policy objectives: stronger
EPA rules on Carbon emissions and farm dust, eliminating the secret ballot in
union organization, raising tax rates, and other potential regulatory changes that
make it impossible for business leaders and investors to accurately forecast future
market conditions. The data suggests that rather than risking their capital on the
whims of an election, investors are shrewdly following their self-interest and
delaying their plans until the systemic uncertainty has been diminished and a
clearer picture of future market conditions can be obtained.

60

The Office of the Presidency, “Speeches and Addresses,” whitehouse.gov, accessed October
2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/5

16

Kreider: Systemic Uncertainty

Appendix 1: Graphs

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012

17

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 9 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 5

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/5

18

Kreider: Systemic Uncertainty

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012

19

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 9 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 5

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/5

20

Kreider: Systemic Uncertainty

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012

21

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 9 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 5

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/5

22

Kreider: Systemic Uncertainty

References
Alston, Lee, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass North. Introduction to Empirical
Studies in Institutional Change, eds. Lee Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and
Douglass North New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Arellano, Cristina, Yan Bai, and Patrick Kehoe. “Financial Markets and
Fluctuations in Uncertainty.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
Research Department Staff Report (2010).
Bachmann, Rudiger and Christian Bayer. “Uncertainty Business Cycles Really?” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.
16862 (2009).
Bachmann, Rudiger, Steffen Elstner, and Eric Sims. “Uncertainty and Economic
Activity, Evidence from Business Survey Data.” National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 16143 (2010).
Barro, Robert. “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 106 (1991): 407-43
Bloom, Nicholas. “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks.” Econometrica 77, no. 3
(2009): 623–685.
Borner, Silvio, Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder. Political Credibility and
Economic Development. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.
Cantillon, Richard. Essai sur la nature de commerce en general, trans. Henry
Higgs London: Macmillan, 1755.
Casson, Mark. The Entrepreneur: An economic Theory. Oxford: Martin
Robertson, 1982.
Chen, Jing. “Fund Managers Not Dodd-Frank Fans.” www.hedgefund.net. Sept.
27,
2011.
Accessed
Dec.
7,
2011.
http://hedgefund.net/publicnews/default.aspx?story=12914.
Chief Executive Magazine. “Job Creators Prefer John McCain 4-to-1 Over Barack
Obama.” ChiefExecutive.net. October 8, 2008. Accessed December 9,
2011.
http://chiefexecutive.net/job-creators-prefer-john-mccain-4-to-1over-barack-obama.
Discover Small Business Watch. “Discover Survey Finds Majority of Small
Business Owners Favor Repeal of Health-Care Reform Law.”

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012

23

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 9 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 5

InsuranceTechnology,
Jan.
18,
2011.
technology.tmcnet.com/news/2011/01/18/5251891.htm.

http://insurance-

Dornbusch, Rudiger. “Policies to Move from Stabilization to Growth.”
Proceedings of the 1990 World Bank Annual Conference on Development
Economics (1991): 19-48.
Dreschler, Itamar. “Uncertainty, Time-Varying Fear, and Asset Prices.” Wharton
School of Business (2009): 1-68.
Duke/CFO Magazine. “Global Business Outlook Survey.” cfosurvey.org.
Accessed Dec. 12, 2011. http://www.cfosurvey.org/index.htm.
Ernst & Young. “Compliance perspectives on new regulations 2011,”
www.ey.com.
2011.
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Compliance_Perspectives_o
n_New_Regulation_2011_FINAL/$FILE/Compliance_Perspectives_on_N
ew_Regulation_2011_FINAL.pdf, 4.
Federal Register.gov. Accessed 12/5/2010. http://www.federalregister.gov.
Federal

Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. “Business Outlook Survey.”
www.phil.frb.org.
Accessed
Dec.
12,
2011.
http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/regional-economy/businessoutlook-survey/.

Foss, Nicolai and Peter G. Klein. “Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of
the Firm: Any Gains from Trade?” in Handbook of Entrepreneurship
Research: Disciplinary Perspectives, eds. Rashjree Agarwal, Sharon A.
Alvarez, and Olaf Sorenson Dordrecht: Springer, 2005.
Gilchrist, Simon, Jae Sim, and Egon Zakrajsek. “Uncertainty, Financial Frictions,
and Investment Dynamics.” mimeo Boston University Department of
Economics (2010): 1-43.
Greenspan, Alan. “Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy.” The American
Economic Review 94, no. 2 Papers and Proceedings of the 116th Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 2004): 33-40.
Henisz, Witold. “The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth.”
Economics and Politics 12, no. 1 (2000): 1-31.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/5

24

Kreider: Systemic Uncertainty

Higgs, Robert. “U.S. Economic Recovery Remains Anemic, at Best.” The Beacon
Blog, Nov. 6, 2011. http://blog.independent.org/2011/11/06/u-s-economicrecovery-remains-anemic-at-best.
Higgs, Robert. “Regime Uncertainty: Why the Great Depression Lasted So Long
and Why Prosperity Resumed after the War.” The Independent Review 1,
no. 4 (1997): 561-590.
Ivy, Jenny, quoting Larry Boress. “Reform takes aim at benefits, employers say.”
benefitspro.com.
Jan.
3,
2011.
http://www.benefitspro.com/2011/01/03/reform-takes-aim-at-benefitsemployers-say.
Jordan, Nichole. “Bank Executive Survey: Bankers’ optimism rebounds amid
concerns over Dodd-Frank.” www.grantthornton.com. June 2011.
Accessed
Dec.
8,
2011.
http://www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Financial%20services/F
SandFI%20files/Bank%20Survey/Grant%20Thornton%20LLPBank%20Director18th%20Annual%20Bank%20Executive%20Survey.pdf, 2.
Julio, Brandon and Youngsuk Yook. “Political Uncertainty and Corporate
Investment Cycles.” Journal of Finance, forthcoming (2010).
Kirzner, Israel. Perception, Opportunity and Profit: Studies in the Theory of
Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
Klein, Peter G. “New Institutional Economics.” in Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics, eds. B. Bouckeart and G. De Geest Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar, 2000: 456-89.
Klein, Peter G. “Opportunity Discovery, Entrepreneurial Action, and Economic
Organization.” Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, forthcoming (2008):
1-33.
Klein, Peter G. and Hung Luu. “Politics and Productivity.” Economic Inquiry 41,
no. 3 (2003): 433-47.
Knight, Frank. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. New York: August M. Kelly
Publishing, 1964.
Langlois, Richard and Metin Cosgel. “Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, and the
Firm: A New Interpretation.” Economic Inquiry 31 (1993): 456–65.

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012

25

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 9 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 5

Lawson, Gary. “Reviving Formal Rulemaking: Openness and Accountability for
Obamacare.” Heritage Backgrounder no. 2585. July 25, 2011.
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2585.pdf.
McKinsey & Co. “Employer Survey on US Health care Reform: Details regarding
the
survey
methodology.”
mckinsey.com.
June
2011.
www.mckinsey.com/Features/US_employer_healthcare_survey.
McPartland, Kevin. “Credit and Rate Swap Dealers 2011: Redefined and
Reborn.”
Tabb
Group.com.
Oct.
12,
2011.
http://www.tabbgroup.com/PublicationDetail.aspx?PublicationID=996.
Midwest Business Health Group. “Key Findings of Employer Reaction to Health
Reform-Post
Election
Survey.”
Dec.
22,
2010.
https://www.mbgh.org/templates/UserFiles/Files/Key%20Findings%20of
%20Dec%202010%20Survey%20of%20Employers%20Reacton%20to%2
0Health%20Reform(2).pdf.
Mises, Ludwig von. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. Auburn, AL:
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998.
Murphy, Kevin, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. “The Allocation of Talent:
Implications for Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics (1991): 503530.
Murphy, Richard. “Why Bush Gets a Thumbs-Up on Main Street.” Fortune Small
Business.
Oct.
1,
2004.
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/2004/10/01/8187291/ind
ex.htm.
North, Douglass. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990.
North, Douglass and Robert Thomas. The Rise of the Western World: A New
Economic History. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
Office of the Presidency, The. “Speeches and Remarks.” whitehouse.gov.
Accessed
October
2011.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/speeches-and-remarks.
Olson, Mancur. “Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why some nations are rich and
others poor.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (1995): 3-24.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/5

26

Kreider: Systemic Uncertainty

Pindyck, Robert. “Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment.” Journal of
Economic Literature 29 (1991): 1110-48.
Przybyla, Heidi. “Obama Seen as Anti-Business by 77% of U.S. Investors.”
Bloomberg.com.
Jan.
21,
2010.
Accessed
Dec.
2011.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8UiI1bCR
dmY.
Rodrik, Dani. “The Positive Economics of Policy Reform.” American Economic
Review 83 (1993): 356-361.
Rothbard, Murray. Man, Economy, and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles.
Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1962.
Schultz, T.W. “The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria.” Journal of
Economic Literature 13 (1975): 827–46.
Schultz, T.W. “Investment in Entrepreneurial Ability,” Scandinavian Journal of
Economics 82 (1982): 437–48.
Schumpeter, Joseph. Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical
Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York: McGraw Hill, 1939
Schumpeter, Joseph. The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into
Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1911.
Stasavage, David. “Private Investment and Political Uncertainty.” London School
of Economics Discussion Paper No. DEDPS 25 (2000): 1-37.
Turner, Grace-Marie, et al. Why ObamaCare is Wrong for America. New York:
HarperCollins, 2011.
Witt, Ulrich. “Imagination and Leadership: the Neglected Dimension of an
Evolutionary Theory of the Firm.” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 35 (1998): 161–77.
World Bank. The State in a Changing World. New York; Oxford University
Press, 1997.

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012

27

